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Democracy and education: In spite of it all  
 
Introduction 
Just over on hundred years ago, with the publication of Democracy and Education, 
Dewey made a case for the mutually dependent relationship linking a legitimate 
education system and a thriving democracy. A century on, many would argue that 
democracy and education have been decoupled and that both have been diminished 
and devalued as a result (Labaree, 2011; Schostak & Goodson, 2012). Of course, this 
begs the question as to the degree to which democracy and education have ever been 
harmonised; but Dewey’s point was that knowledge needs to be conceived of as 
necessarily tentative and provisional and that democracy, insofar as it is open to the 
inevitability of change and difference, is the only political form of organisation 
capable of providing an environment conducive to this conception of knowledge. Part 
of my argument in this paper is that today’s democratic politics has, to a considerable 
degree, been captured by the assumed certainties of neoclassical economics and that 
this situation is mirrored – again, not entirely but to a recognisable and worrying 
degree – in education. In order to make this argument, I draw on the psychoanalytic 
notions of ideology, enjoyment and fantasy, drawing in particular on work in political 
theory that links these notions to social questions of power and politics (Dean, 2009; 
Glynos, 2001; Glynos & Stavrakakis, 2008; Stavrakakis, 1999, 2007; Žižek, 1997). 
The benefit of adopting these notions is to highlight the pervasive presence of illusions 
and the forms of violence – epistemic, symbolic and material – that sustain them. 
However, despite the seeming pessimism this suggests, I conclude with a plea for 
continually striving to renew the links between democracy and education – as the title 
of the paper indicates, ‘in spite of it all’1 – by not only critiquing the current dominant 
models of democracy and education but also by seeking to traverse and let go of the 
fantasies that keep us tethered to our unfreedom. 
 
A note on ideology, enjoyment and fantasy 
In broad terms, psychoanalytic theory can be understood as articulating a lack of ‘fit’ 
between the individual and the social, which means that the former can never be 
perfectly adapted to the latter, no matter how much government, education or therapy                                                         1 The phrase ‘in spite of it all’ is borrowed from the recent special issue of Studies in 
Philosophy and Education, edited by Emile Bojesen, entitled ‘Education, In Spite of it All’. 
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she or he is subjected to (Donald, 1992, p. 3). This lack of fit reflects a deeper 
constitutive split between the universal and the particular, framed in terms of a tragic 
dialectical dance between “fantasy and traumatic failure” (Daly, 1999, p. 233). For 
instance, all attempts to identify the (universal) notion of the subject with any 
particular historical or cultural subject fall short and come adrift in the face of the gap 
or void around which such particularities must wrap themselves: “the subject is 
precisely that which cannot be fully constituted through subject-positions; a universal 
(de-)constitutive void ($) which ultimately resists all forms of particularistic 
interpellation” (Daly, 1999, p. 233). The gap, or void, which prevents the suturing of 
the universal and the particular is the traumatic Real – “the symbolic order’s point of 
inner fracture, the Real is what resists being symbolized, a kind of surplus or leftover 
which remains when reality has been thoroughly formalized” (Eagleton, 2009, p. 
144). We might think of the Real as an ‘immanent blockage’ that prevents both the 
subject and society from ever being self-identical by implanting an insurmountable 
alien-ness. In this sense, despite our ongoing attempts to accommodate ourselves to 
reality we remain perpetual misfits. 
 
Ideology, in these terms, involves forms of misrecognition of the Real, reflected in 
attempts to incorporate it into, and reconcile it with, the intelligible structures of 
reality. Ideology thus goes beyond logic or discourse, even as it seeks to manage or 
domesticate this ‘beyond’ within the confines of logic and discourse. We can see this 
in relation to recent attempts to articulate specific ‘British’ values – attempts which 
either miss their point by positing values such as ‘democracy’ and ‘respect for law’ 
that clearly exceed ‘Britishness’; or which exhaust themselves and end up 
tautologically referring to ‘British’ customs and the ‘British’ way of life.  
 
Ideological projects such as nationalism can thus be understood as consequences of 
our constitution as un-natural subjects of language and discourse. In Lacanian terms, 
our entry into the symbolic order of language as subjects brings the loss of our pre-
subjective sense of oneness with the world and the purported enjoyment that 
accompanied that state. Of course, as subjects, we never experienced this state 
because it was pre-subjective – prior to our formation as social beings of language 
and the law – and hence our positing of this enjoyment before and beyond language 
is, paradoxically, a retroversive consequence of our becoming subjects of language 
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(Shepherdson, 2008). Yet we spend our lives seeking to recapture the intense 
enjoyment associated with this purportedly lost object, and it is the existential ‘lack’ 
associated with this loss that fuels the insatiability of desire – even as we 
misrecognise objects of pleasure as sources of enjoyment – whether it be for the latest 
smartphone, ‘taking back control’ (to quote the UK Brexiteers), or improved national 
outcomes in the Program of International Student Assessment (PISA). Enjoyment 
here should not be equated with pleasure – indeed, the latter serves as a means of 
moderating the tempestuous qualities of the former (Schuster, 2016, p. 118) – but 
instead “might be understood as a kind of existential electricity which not only 
animates the subject but which also threatens to destroy him/her” (Daly, 1999, p. 
227). One way of understanding institutionalized cultural phenomena like education 
and politics is as social strategies for managing enjoyment, in part by converting it 
into less unruly forms, such as the desire for approval and belonging. 
  
If ideology involves the misrecognition of the impossibility of any complete or self-
sufficient identities, whether individual or social, fantasy involves attempts to 
attribute this impossibility to an external (and hence potentially eliminable) rather 
than an immanent (and hence constitutive) object-cause. Fantasy thus identifies a 
concrete other who can be held to account for the (misrecognized) external blockage. 
Fantasy thus represents the illusory prospect of unity and closure once the external 
obstacle is removed – full national sovereignty will be secured once we leave the 
European Union and ‘take back control’, for instance, while educational success for 
all will follow from teachers’ adoption of ‘evidence-based best practice’; yet at the 
same time, owing to the immanent rather than contingent nature of the blockage of the 
Real and the constitutive impossibility of unity or closure, the illusion of fantasy 
relies on identifying and demonizing the scapegoated other who supposedly prevents 
the realization of the fantasy. Corrupt EU officials in Brussels or recalcitrant teachers 
in schools thus fulfill the role of the other as “someone who gives body to the very 
excess of enjoyment which, in our innermost being, denies us homeostasis” (Daly, 
1999, p. 230). 
 
The unfinished project of democracy 
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The very idea of democracy, the meaning of democracy, must be continually 
explored afresh; it has to be constantly discovered and rediscovered, remade and 
reorganised (Dewey, 1937 [1987], p. 182) 
 
As both a concept and a practice, democracy has clearly enjoyed a long life, reaching 
back at least to Ancient Greece. But ancient democracy was fundamentally different 
to modern versions in that the former was ‘direct’, with the governed – so long as they 
were male citizens and not female citizens or children or slaves – involved in the 
decisions of government, whereas modern democracy is indirect, or representative, 
democracy (Cartledge, 2016). Throughout its long history, democracy has, of course, 
has had its critics. Plato criticised Athenian democracy for undermining good 
government by pandering to the ignorant poor, while in twentieth century critics such 
as Walter Lipmann (1922, 1925) attacked modern representative democracy on 
similarly elitist grounds, arguing that the complexity of society coupled with the 
expert knowledge needed for competent decision making rendered the ideal of 
representative democracy impossible. Echoing Plato’s call to restrict the business of 
government to the wise elders, Lippmann argued that experienced administrators and 
qualified insiders, such as industrial leaders, were best placed to run the affairs of the 
state. Dewey (1927) criticised Lippmann, suggesting that his recommendation to 
replace participatory democracy with a technocracy of experts reflected a failure of 
political imagination. In particular, Dewey believed that Lippmann’s arguments about 
the role of the media in the manufacture of consent in modern democracies 
underestimated the potential of a progressive education system to contribute to the 
creation of a truly democratic public sphere comprising institutions in which people 
would be enculturated into democracy through participation in democratic processes 
of deliberation and decision-making.  
 
Lippmann’s contributions had a significant impact, however, prompting the 
convening of the 1938 Colloque Walter Lippmann, an international congress 
organised by philosopher Louis Rougier and held in Paris to discuss Lippmann’s 
ideas. Attended by, amongst others, Friedrich Hayek and Ludwig von Mises, the 
Colloque was a forerunner to the post WWII forum, the Mont Pèlerin Society. Indeed, 
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the loose body of beliefs now known as neoliberalism2 can be traced at least as far 
back as the inaugural meeting of the Mont Pèlerin Society (MPS) in 1947 where, in 
the comparatively tranquil setting of the Swiss village of Vevey, Friedrich Hayek and 
his fellow Mont Pèlerin Society members – including such familiar names as Karl 
Popper and Milton Friedman – envisaged, and began preparing for, an ensuing battle 
of ideas over the coming generation (Mirowski & Plehwe, 2009). This was a battle 
framed by Hayek (1944) as one between freedom and serfdom. For Hayek, the main 
threat to freedom, and the individualism on which freedom, in his view, depended, 
was posed by collectivism and central planning, including not only by the distant, if 
living, reality of Soviet-style communism but much closer to home in the 
contemporary liberal welfare economics represented in the US by the legacy of 
Roosevelt and in the UK by the agendas of Keynes and Beveridge (Tribe, 2009, p. 
76). As he warned in the opening pages of The road to serfdom, “we have 
progressively abandoned that freedom in economic affairs without which personal 
and political freedom has never existed in the past” (1944, p. 10). Although marginal 
for several decades in the post-war years, the ideas promulgated though the Mont 
Pèlerin Society and its global networks found their political champions in Ronald 
Regan and Margaret Thatcher leading to “the accretion of neoliberal attitudes, 
imaginaries, and practices that have come to inform everyday life in the first few 
decades of the new millennium” (Mirowski, 2013, p. 90). 
 
Neoliberal thinking is focused around the key democratic value of freedom, 
particularly freedom to choose and freedom to compete. Surveying the contemporary 
political landscape and the rise of populism, reflected in events such as the United 
Kingdom’s Brexit vote and the election of Donald Trump as President of the USA, it 
is hard not to notice the prominence of references to democracy and related notions of 
freedom and sovereignty in the name of ‘the people’ whose ‘will’ must be respected. 
Yet at the same time, a fantasmatic discourse can be identified that we might 
characterise as a ‘yearning for yesterday’3 whose achievement is being blocked by                                                         2 The term ‘neoliberalism’ was one that these same scholars had elected to adopt at the 
Colloque Walter Lipmann, in Paris, 1938, in order to convey their sense of the need for a 
revived and reconstructed liberalism to meet the economic and political challenges of modern 
times (Davies, 2014; Polanyi, 1944). 3 See, for example, https://global.handelsblatt.com/opinion/turkeys-yearning-for-yesterday-
750302 
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nefarious others – EU officials in the case of Brexit and mainstream politicians in the 
case of Trump. Indeed, reflecting on recent politics developments highlights the 
relevance of Paul Hoggett’s comment on how pervasive the past is in the present: 
“how the premodern (and particularly the sacred, magical and mythical) constantly 
inserts itself into the body of the modern: in nationalism and the myth of the chosen 
people, in the renewed vigour of modern charismatics, [and] in the millenarianism of 
totalitarian ideologies” (2015, p. 175). The lure of a fantasmatic return to the past is 
lies at the heart of calls to ‘take back control’ or to ‘make America great again’. 
 
The rise of backward looking forms of populism has been described as fundamentally 
anti-democratic4. But at the same time, contemporary populism serves as a powerful 
critique of the limits of contemporary forms of democratic politics5 by exposing the 
gap between official ideologies and felt reality, between the ideal and the lived reality 
of democracy; indeed, this gap reminds us that “what democracy might mean, or the 
range of possibilities democracy is meant to encompass, remains unclear, to say the 
least” (Dean, 2009, p. 75). Dean goes on to note – and it gets worse – how “real, 
existing democracies privilege the wealthy. As they install, extend, and protect 
neoliberal capitalism, they exclude, exploit, and oppress the poor, all the while 
promising that everyone wins” (p. 76). This trick is achieved in ‘real’ democracies by 
placing certain economic fundamental principles and policies – regarding, for 
instance, profit, competition, growth, investment – off-limits, as far as democratic 
disagreement and debate are concerned. Thus, contingent policy choices are often 
justified through the deployment of ‘common sense’ language; the policy decision to 
impose austerity, for instance, is defended in terms of addressing the need to ‘balance 
the books’, despite the fact that a significant consequence of the policy is highly 
ideological, i.e. the redistribution of wealth to the already wealthy. With key 
economic fundamentals secured from political intervention, capitalists and plutocrats 
of all political persuasion can extoll the virtues of democracy, safe in the knowledge 
that their wealth and privilege are assured.  
 
                                                        4 https://newrepublic.com/article/135757/anti-democratic-urge 5 https://www.spectator.co.uk/2016/12/populism-vs-post-democracy/ 
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This situation has led a number of recent commentators, such as Colin Crouch (2004), 
to describe our current era in terms of a ‘post democracy’, characterized by an 
increase in the volume of democratic rhetoric alongside a series of assaults on the 
core themes of democratic society rights, equality, freedom and popular sovereignty. 
In this sense, democracy has been ‘disenchanted’ by economics, with competitiveness 
in terms of wealth creation as the overriding criterion by which any political program 
is now judged (Davies, 2014). Or as Wendy Brown puts it, 
 
insofar as economization of the political and suffusion of public discourse with 
governance eliminate the categories of both the demos and sovereignty, the 
value – even the intelligibility – of popular sovereignty is rubbed out. 
Economization replaces a political lexicon with a market lexicon. Governance 
replaces a political lexicon with a management lexicon (p. 207). 
 
If this wasn’t bad enough, the rise of extremism in various guises can be linked to the 
replacement of politics by economics and performativity, both of which privilege 
matters of efficiency over questions of purpose. As Terry Eagleton notes, “extremism 
is among other things a reaction to a politics which has grown vacuously managerial” 
(Eagleton, 2006, p. 55). Over time, as people see no opportunity for airing grievances 
or addressing core concerns, they are likely to become susceptible to political rhetoric 
that identifies a convenient (and often powerless) other, such as refugees or 
immigrants, who can be blamed for their woes. Indeed, the appeal of popular 
rightwing parties can be understood in similar fashion, in terms of a desire to derive 
enjoyment from the transgressing the limitations imposed by democracy, such as 
those established by ‘political correctness’ and deriving enjoyment from attributing 
blame and responsibility to the demonized other. The supporters of populist parties 
such As UKIP want to see themselves as rebellious and victimised nationalists 
seeking redress, not as magnanimous, obedient or elite ones (McGowan, 2013), and 
populist leaders, such as Nigel Farage, Marine Le Pen and Donald Trump, achieve 
success by seeming to embody this transgressive enjoyment though their opposition to 
government elites. Yet “what the opponents of government would have, rather than a 
democracy, is the total community in which separate identity is lost. And this total 
community is imagined to be the way, as adults, we can return to the primitive world 
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of seamless gratification” (Levine, 2017, p. 116). As Levine goes on to note, 
“democracy can have no place in fantasies of this kind” (p. 116). 
  
In this sense, it can be argued that the rise of neoliberal performativity has provided 
both nationalist sentiment and racist violence with newfound legitimacy, embodying 
what Henry Giroux and others describe as ‘proto-fascism’, i.e. an ideology and a set 
of social practices that scorn the present “while calling for a revolution that rescues a 
deeply anti-modernist past as a way to revolutionize the future” (Giroux, 2004, p. 16).  
Such co-implication of democratic governments in anti-democratic practices led 
Slavoj Žižek, as long ago as 2001, to comment that democracy should now be 
considered a reactionary term and argue that it “is more and more a false issue, a 
notion so discredited by its predominant use that, perhaps one should take the risk of 
abandoning it to the enemy” (Žižek, 2001, p. 123).  
 
Yet Žižek’s provocative statement ignores the fact that democracy has always been a 
paradoxical term, as the young Marx knew when he contrasted actually existing 
democracy, involving the bureaucratic administration of the state, with democratic 
self-determination: “it is self-evident that all forms of state have democracy as their 
truth and for that reason are untrue to the extent that they are not democracy” (Marx, 
1975, p. 89). John Keane (2009, p. 868) also highlights the paradoxical qualities of 
democracy when he insists, “democracy champions not the Rule of the People – that 
definition of democracy belongs in more than one way to the Age of Monarchy and 
the Era of Dictatorship and Total Power – but the rule that nobody should rule”.  
Chantal Mouffe (2000) brings a poststructuralist sensibility to the democratic 
paradox, noting how the self-sufficient unity of the demos is impossible to the extent 
that it relies on plurality – on forging ‘unum’ from ‘pluribus’ – and on the 
establishment of boundaries between inclusion and exclusion. Dewey himself 
recognized the paradoxical status of democracy as an ideal incapable of realization, 
noting that “democracy in this sense is not a fact and never will be” (1998, p. 295). 
 
From this perspective, democracy is not so much the expression of the ‘will of the 
people’, but rather, something that emerges “when we experience the ultimate 
groundlessness of political power itself, when we experience the absence of any 
foundational social authority making itself felt” (McGowan, 2013, p. 194). It arises 
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when we recognize the absence of any metaphysical foundation underpinning society, 
thereby acknowledging the latter’s divided nature, and consequently assume 
responsibility for our social and political organization. Indeed, in articulating her 
notion of the fundamentally antagonistic and divided nature of the demos and the 
impossibility of democratic unity, Mouffe draws on Lacanian arguments about the 
irreducibility of the Real which dooms any political project based around symbolic 
articulation of the ‘good’ to failure (pp. 137-140). In contrast to either the populist 
fantasy of re-discovering national unity or the neoliberal substitution of a technically-
oriented economics for politics, this requires a democratic politics that “does not 
dream of an impossible reconciliation because it acknowledges not only that the 
multiplicity of ideas of the good is irreducible but also that antagonism and violence 
are ineradicable” (Mouffe, 2000, p. 139). Rather than pursuing grand schemes for 
creating a harmonious society or installing the perfect democracy, the questions move 
to the more troubling register: how to manage the constitutive antagonism at the 
kernel of the individual and society? what to do with ineradicable violence? As John 
Rajchman (1991, p. 70) asks, “what sort of community can we have as divided 
subjects?” Acknowledging, rather than suppressing, these questions has to be a 
starting point for democratic politics that is willing to forego fantasies of totalisation 
or reconciliation and to see itself as an unfinished and unfinalizable project. But the 
specters of dislocation, antagonism and emptiness are not unique to democracy – they 
also haunt education. 
 
Education and the lure of fantasy 
It is perhaps no accident that as the social and economic support structures afforded 
by the post WWII welfare state have been dismantled, education has come to occupy 
a pivotal position in political discourse – think of Tony Blair’s catchcall ‘Education, 
Education, Education’ – elevated as the key to societal fulfilment and revered as the 
path to personal advancement. Yet like democracy, education is in danger of 
becoming, at best, a somewhat vague term, emptied of meaning by being overfilled 
with multiple and contradictory associations and expectations, including, amongst 
other things, empowerment and repression, individuation and socialisation, 
emancipation and regulation, inquiry and transmission, creativity and standardisation. 
Education can be all of these things but it cannot be them all at one and the same time. 
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In addition, like democracy, education today seems to be entangled in the lures of a 
backward-looking politics of fantasy. We see this for instance in the calls by UK 
Prime Minister Theresa May for a return to grammar schools and selective education. 
We see it in Victorian notions that children should be seen and not heard that are 
taking on new life in schools where regimes of silence is imposed in classrooms and 
corridors in the USA and the UK. And we see it in the return to the disciplinary logic 
of ‘spare the rod and spoil the child’ that is finding new expression in punitive and 
authoritarian regimes that proudly announce their ‘three strikes and you’re out’, ‘zero-
tolerance’ culture as part of the militarisation of schools (Berliner & Glass, 2014; 
Nguyen, 2017; Robbins, 2014). These and other disturbing developments, which are 
justified by references to ‘closing the gap’ and ‘raising aspirations’, raise questions 
and highlight issues regarding the relationship between democracy and education; but 
they also raise questions about how education might be inflected in a new key, 
involving more democratic, less authoritarian, discourses. How might it come to be 
characterised by more egalitarian and participatory, as opposed to hierarchical and 
exclusionary, practices? Or is the Deweyan vision of schools as engines of social 
democracy just another illusion – a cruelly optimistic fantasy through which we 
reconcile ourselves as educators to our part in its brutal machinery? 
 
Certainly, surveying the authoritarian strains in historical manifestations of education 
– at least in the form of formal schooling – we might characterise it as a form of 
‘benign violence’ (Allen, 2014). Contemporary neoliberalised versions of education 
sustain this violence in the form of relentless circuits of audit, performativity and 
competition, supported by the resurgent punitive disciplinary regimes noted above.  
 
However, thinking of education as something that exceeds the institutional limitations 
of formal schooling invites more open, and optimistic, definitions such as that 
provided by Peter Moss (2014, p. 93), for whom education 
 
involves the creation or realisation of the self as a subject, not following a 
predetermined route but creating something new and unique; it strives to bring 
about a subject able to think and speak for herself; but it is also about the self in 
relation to others and the wider society, so that self-realisation is not confused 
with autonomy but presumes interdependence, obligation and responsibility. 
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If we seek an education gestured towards in this definition – one that is open to 
possibility and oriented towards inquiry and the discovery of new knowledge and 
insights, rather than merely oriented towards the transmission of the already known – 
then, as Dewey realised, a democratic politics, with all the caveats noted above as to 
what democracy might mean, is the only form commensurate with the very ontology 
of possibility (Amsler, 2015; Donald, 1992). At the same time, as noted already 
above, I am mindful of the tendency common to both democracy and education to fall 
short of the expectations and how, in the case of education, “inflated promises about 
both the fulfilment of the child and the development of society are endlessly broken in 
practice” (Donald, 1992, p. ix). This is, in part, a reflection of the lack of fit between 
the individual and the social, meaning that “the self cannot be perfectly adapted to 
social norms, even through ever more pervasive techniques of education, government, 
or therapy” (Donald, 1992, p. 3). In one sense, this suggests that education is a 
doomed enterprise, redeemable only through violence, fantasy or some combination 
of the two, though I would also note that both educational outcomes and practices 
tend to be more democratic in more equal societies (Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009), 
which highlights the importance of political and economic democracy as a 
precondition to educational democracy (Blacker, 2013). But one way we might make 
education less oppressive and authoritarian than it has so often been is to recognize 
and seek to undo the power of the fantasies that we use to frame education. 
 
To put this another way, right-wing populism may be locked in a fantasy scenario, the 
non-realisability of which can conveniently be blamed on a number of scapegoats, 
from immigrants to metropolitan elites. But those of us who might consider ourselves 
progressive critics of contemporary democratic capitalism and its deleterious 
influence on education, are not immune to fantasmatic thinking, involving, in part, the 
overvaluing of belief and the turning of a blind eye to action (Fisher, 2009). Thus, for 
example, we believe that our identities are reflected in our anti-capitalist beliefs rather 
than in our thoroughly capitalist behaviours as consumers and actors in the structures 
of capitalism. Similarly, in relation to the obsessive-compulsive circuit of testing, 
assessment and data collection that much education has become reduced to, the 
system is reproduced through the activities and procedures of schooling and education 
in which we play an active part, rather than through our beliefs; indeed to the extent 
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that we hold fast in our beliefs that this form of education is a charade, for which we 
pin the blame on convenient ‘others’ like Michael Gove, we may secure the 
intellectual distance that enables us to continue to participate in and reproduce the 
neoliberal regime of schooling and society. We may also derive a frisson of 
enjoyment from our students’ or our institutions’ performance in the derided 
circuits/circus of performativity, just as we do from our publication and citation data. 
In this sense, much of our anti-neoliberal writing in education and social science share 
something of the hysterical tenor – written with the reassuring safety that our words 
will not change the world – as the more overtly hysterical complaints of the popular 
right.  
 
An initial step then in resisting the neoliberalisation of education requires us to accept 
our insertion into its machinery at the level of fantasy, enjoyment and desire and our 
complicity in terms of our actions. This is no easy task, however. Indeed, far from 
bringing about the changes we ‘believe’ in, extracting ourselves from the neoliberal 
machine may risk our coherence as educational and professional subjects leading to a 
literal crisis of subjectivity. Fantasies and fatmasmatic thinking may limit our 
movement by “holding us captive to the idea that the basic structure of our lives is 
determined in advance rather than constituted in the process of living” but at the same 
time they cater to our need for a secure and reassuring sense of ourselves and our 
place in the world (Ruti, 2009, p. 101). Hence, traversing the fantasies associated with 
neoliberalism is not something individuals can realistically undertake alone. 
Resistance requires a collective rather than a purely individual response. As Amy 
Allen reminds us, “what is missing is the realization that a possible way out of this 
attachment to subjection lies in collective social experimentation and political 
transformation, rather than a Nietzschean emphasis on the heroic individual” (Allen, 
2008, pp. 11-12).  
 
Democracy and education in spite of it all: Recognising and traversing fantasies 
The intensified form of neoliberalism known as austerity represents not just a fiscal, 
but an intellectual, form of discipline, one that stultifies the individual and collective 
imagination with its insistence that there is no alternative to the stratifying and 
competitive logics of the market (De Lissovoy, 2015). In this sense, neoliberal 
political economy is its own form of education, training subjects in the fatalistic 
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discipline of capitulation to the powerful aura of the market in order to embrace what 
Mark Fisher (2009) describes as capitalist realism – a world in which capitalism is the 
only reality and in which there are no alternatives.  
 
But if neoliberalism is all about individualism and competition, democracy, to the 
extent that it is centred on the common, offers a potential counter-discourse. Whilst 
neoliberalism is an imaginary of scarcity and limitations, democracy offers an 
imaginary of possibilities. The challenge for education is to articulate an alternative 
vision, and find an alternative voice, to the restrictive and reductive lessons offered by 
neoliberal austerity. To achieve this requires the imaginative deployment of 
conceptual, intellectual and practical resources. But, as already noted, it also requires 
a frank confrontation with our own complicity in, for example, the objectification and 
stratification of people – our students – through assessment practices, which translate 
activity into hierarchically arranged grades, thereby reifying and reproducing the 
fetishisation of numbers in the form of the score and the result. It also requires 
recognition of our ideological and material investment in the cruel optimism of so 
much education, embodied in slogans and policies like Every Child Matters and No 
Child Left Behind – for clearly, not every child matters to schools, or at least not 
equally, while many children are left behind as a consequence of the stratifying and 
categorising policies purporting to ensure their success.  
 
Yet we cannot hope to grapple with these issues until we see our students, and 
particularly ourselves, not only in relation to conscious knowledge, but also as 
subjects of unconscious desire. Disconcertingly – for educators like to see themselves 
as champions of justice – this requires recognizing ourselves as subjects who “have an 
unconscious investment in the power of social authority that leads to a surplus of 
obedience, an obedience that goes further than the authority itself requires” 
(McGowan, 2015, p. 13), notwithstanding our protestations to the contrary. It also 
means letting go of notions of promethean agency in relation to education, teaching 
and learning and instead coming to embrace such seemingly counterintuitive notions 
as ‘passive education’, including “learning from the aspects of experience that 
structural forms of education do not acknowledge” (Bojesen, 2016, p. 7) and allowing 
our institutionalised identities to become, at least partly, unmoored and untethered. It 
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means acknowledging, and to some degree embracing, the constitutive role of lack 
and loss in our being. 
 
For ironically, our primordial loss – our exile from access to unmediated reality – that 
comes as the prices of our constitution as subjects of language and the signifier, is 
also a precondition for care. In Kaja Silverman’s words “only if we pay this 
exorbitant price early in our lives can things and people ‘matter’ to us” (2000, pp. 38-
39). Specifically, we need to recognise the distinction between the sort of narcissistic 
desire, which seeks to iron out the inconsistencies and complexities of the world and 
which views others as objects for bolstering a tightly-held image of the self, and a less 
self-centred desire which seeks to re-experience the pain-tinged enjoyment of its 
originary loss through its receptivity “to the resurfacing in the present and future of 
what has been – not as an exercise in solitary narcissistic solipsism, but rather as an 
extension in ever new directions of his [sic] capacity to care” (Silverman, 2000, p. 
62). This latter form comprises “something like an ethics of desire – an ethics 
grounded in a passion for symbolization, in a delight in the manifold and ever new 
forms that the past can assume” (2000, p. 62). As Mouffe (2000, p. 139) argues, such 
an ethics, “which strives to create among us a new form of bond, a bond that 
recognises us as divided subjects”, is particularly suited to a pluralist democratic 
conception of politics. But critically, if it is to traverse the fantasies that keep us 
tethered to ideologies of limitless growth, exponential accumulation, unfettered access 
and harmonious reconciliation educators must also be willing to entertain the 
uncomfortable surprises and jolts by which we are brought face to face with our 
unconscious desires and our complicity in practises and processes which we would 
prefer to disavow. For such a psychoanalytic ethics, neither democracy nor education 
can save or redeem us; but we can at least try and resist approaching them with our 
‘eyes wide shut’, to quote the title of Stanley Kubrick’s final film (1999), by 
embracing our inevitable loss and by learning to enjoy what we don’t have and don’t 
know. It means not quite giving up on democracy and education, in spite of it all. 
 
 
References Allen, A. (2008). The politics of our selves: Power, autonomy and gender in 
contemporary critical theory. New York: Columbia University Press. 
 15 
Allen, A. (2014). Benign violence: Education in and beyond the age of reason. London: Continuum. Amsler, S. (2015). The education of radical democracy. London: Routledge. Berliner, D. C., & Glass, G. V. (2014). 50 myths and lies that threaten America's 
public schools: The real crisis in education. Columbia, NY: Teachers College Press. Blacker, D. (2013). The falling rate of learning and the neoliberal endgame. Winchester: Zero Books. Bojesen, E. (2016). Passive education. Educational Philosophy and Theory, 1-8.  Cartledge, P. (2016). Democracy: A life. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Crouch, C. (2004). Post-democracy. Cambridge: Polity Press. Daly, G. (1999). Ideology and its paradoxes: Dimensions of fantasy and enjoyment. Journal of Political Ideologies, 4(2), 219-238.  Davies, W. (2014). The limits of neoliberalism: Authority, sovereignty and the logic 
of competition. London: Sage. De Lissovoy, N. (2015). Education and emancipation in the neoliberal era: Being, 
teaching, and power. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan. Dean, J. (2009). Democracy and other neoliberal fantasies. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Dewey, J. (1927). The public and Its problems: An essay in political inquiry. New York: Henry Holt & Co. Dewey, J. (1937 [1987]). The challenge of democracy to education. In J. A. Boydston (Ed.), John Dewey, The later works, 1925–1953 (Vol. 11, pp. 181-190). Carbondale, Il: Southern Illinois University Press. Dewey, J. (1963 [1916]). Democracy and education. New York: Macmillan. Dewey, J. (1998). The essential Dewey. 1. Pragmatism, education, democracy (L. A. Hickman & T. A. Alexander Eds.). Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. Donald, J. (1992). Sentimental education: Schooling, popular culture and the 
regulation of liberty. London: Verso. Eagleton, T. (2006). Holy terror. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Eagleton, T. (2009). Trouble with strangers: A study of ethics. Chichester ; Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. Fisher, M. (2009). Capitalist realism: Is there no alternative? London: Zero Books. Giroux, H. (2004). The terror of neoliberalism: Authoritarianism and the eclipse of 
democracy. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers. Glynos, J. (2001). The grip of ideology: A Lacanian approach to the theory of ideology. Journal of Political Ideologies, 6(2), 191-214.  Glynos, J., & Stavrakakis, Y. (2008). Lacan and political subjectivity: Fantasy and enjoyment in psychoanalysis and political theory. Subjectivity, 24(1), 256-274.  Hayek, F. (1944). The road to serfdom. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Hoggett, P. (2015). Politics, identity and emotion. Boulder, CO: Paradigm. Kubrick, S. (Writer). (1999). Eyes wide shut. Los Angeles: Warner Bros. Labaree, D. (2011). How Dewey lost: The victory of David Snedden and social efficiency in the reform of American education. In D. Tröhler, T. Popkewitz, & D. Labaree (Eds.), Schooling and the making of citizens in the 
long nineteenth century (pp. 163–188). New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 16 
Levine, D. P. (2017). Psychoanalysis, society, and the inner world: Embedded 
meaning in politics and social conflict. New York: Routledge. Lippmann, W. (1922). Public opinion. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co. Lippmann, W. (1925). The phantom public. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. Marx, K. (1975). Critique of Hegel's doctrine of the state. In L. Colletti (Ed.), Karl 
Marx: Early writings. London: Penguin. McGowan, T. (2013). Enjoying what we don't have: The political project of 
psychoanalysis. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press. McGowan, T. (2015). Psychoanalytic film theory and The Rules of the Game. London: Bloomsbury. Mirowski, P. (2013). Never let a serious crisis go to waste: How neoliberalism 
survived the financial meltdown. London: Verso. Mirowski, P., & Plehwe, D. (Eds.). (2009). The road from Mont Pèlerin: The making 
of the neoliberal thought collective. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Moss, P. (2014). Transformative change and real utopias in early childhood 
education: A story of democracy, experimentation and potentiality. London: Routledge. Mouffe, C. (2000). The democratic paradox. London: Verso Books. Nguyen, N. (2017). From school militarization to school securitization: National security finds its place in schools. Critical Studies in Education, 58(1), 52-68.  Polanyi, K. (1944). The great transformation: Economic and political origins of our 
time. New York: Rinehart. Rajchman, J. (1991). Truth and eros: Foucault, Lacan and the question of ethics. New York: Routledge. Robbins, C. G. (2014). Expelling hope: The assault on youth and the militarization 
of schooling. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. Ruti, M. (2009). A world of fragile things: Psychoanalysis and the art of living. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. Schostak, J., & Goodson, I. (2012). What’s wrong with democracy at the moment and why it matters for research and education. Power and Education, 4(3), 257-276.  Schuster, A. (2016). The trouble with pleasure: Deleuze and psychoanalysis. Cambridge MA: The MIT Press. Shepherdson, C. (2008). Lacan and the limits of language. New York: Fordham University Press. Stavrakakis, Y. (1999). Lacan and the political. London: Routledge. Stavrakakis, Y. (2007). The Lacanian left. Edinburgh: Edinburgh Univesity Press. Tribe, K. (2009). Liberalism and neoliberalism in Britain, 1930-1980. In P. Mirowski & D. Plehwe (Eds.), The road from Mont Pèlerin: The making of 
the neoliberal thought collective (pp. 68-97). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Wilkinson, R., & Pickett, K. (2009). The spirit level: Why more equal societies 
almost always do better. London: Allen Lane. 
Žižek, S. (1997). The plague of fantasies. London: Verso. 
Žižek, S. (2001). On belief. London: Routledge. 
 
